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Social comparison, personal relative deprivation,
and materialism
Hyunji Kim1*, Mitchell J. Callan1, Ana I. Gheorghiu1 and William J.
Matthews2
1Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
2Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK
Across five studies, we found consistent evidence for the idea that personal relative
deprivation (PRD), which refers to resentment stemming from the belief that one is
deprivedof deserved outcomes compared to others, uniquely contributes tomaterialism.
In Study 1, self-reports of PRD positively predicted materialistic values over and above
socioeconomic status, personal power, self-esteem, and emotional uncertainty. The
experience of PRD starts with social comparison, and Studies 2 and 3 found that PRD
mediated the positive relation between a tendency tomake social comparisons of abilities
and materialism. In Study 4, participants who learned that they had less (vs. similar)
discretionary income than people like them reported a stronger desire for more money
relative to donating more to charity. In Study 5, during a windfall-spending task,
participants higher in PRD spent more on things they wanted relative to other spending
categories (e.g., paying off debts).
Materialism is generally defined as ‘individual differences in people’s endorsement of
values, goals, and associated beliefs that center on the importance of acquiringmoney and
possessions that convey status’ (Dittmar, Bond, Hurst, & Kasser, 2014, p. 880).
Understanding the psychological factors that correlate with materialism is important
because of its potential negative implications for individuals and for society (Kasser,
2002). For example, people higher in materialism tend to have lower personal well-being
(Dittmar et al., 2014) and greater financial debt (Garðarsdottir & Dittmar, 2012), and are
less concerned about environmental issues (Hurst, Dittmar, Bond, & Kasser, 2013).
Given these potential negative consequences, researchers have been interested in
understanding the antecedents of materialism (see, e.g., Kasser, Ryan, Couchman, &
Sheldon, 2004; Shrum et al., 2014). Experimental and correlational research has shown,
for example, that low self-esteem (Park & John, 2011), low sense of personal power
(Rucker & Galinsky, 2008), feelings of uncertainty (Chang & Arkin, 2002), economic
threat (Sheldon&Kasser, 2008), perceived peer pressure (Banerjee&Dittmar, 2008), and
lower income (Kasser, Ryan, Zax, & Sameroff, 1995) contribute to people adopting
materialistic values and goals. Cutting across these explanations is the idea that increased
materialism is ‘one type of compensatory strategy intended to countermand the
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distressing effects of feelings of insecurity’ (Kasser et al., 2004, p. 13; see also Shrum
et al., 2014). Put differently, according to these accounts, some people place greater
importance on money, possessions, and status because they believe having these things
will, in some way, reduce their feelings of insecurity, increase their sense of personal
power, or improve their self-worth.
In the current research, we examined whether personal relative deprivation (PRD)
also relates to materialism. Personal relative deprivation refers to dissatisfaction and
resentment resulting from the belief that one is deprived of desired and deserved
outcomes compared with what others have (for reviews, see Crosby, 1976; Smith &
Pettigrew, 2014; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). According to Smith
et al. (2012), the experience of PRD stems from a process whereby an individual makes a
social comparison on a given outcome, believes themselves to be unfairly disadvantaged,
and consequently feels resentful and dissatisfied. One key aspect of this process is that
comparative judgements of one’s status – and not simply one’s objective or absolute
status – can elicit a sense of unfairness and resentment. For example, learning that a work
colleague has similar outputs but a higher salary than you can elicit a sense of unfairness
and resentment, even though you might not be ‘objectively’ deprived in terms of your
absolute income. Thus, even people who are ‘well off’ can feel resentful about their lot in
life, whereas those with minimal financial resources may not necessarily feel unfairly
disadvantaged (Crosby, 1976).
Some research has shown that lower socioeconomic status is associated with higher
materialism (e.g., Chang & Arkin, 2002; Kasser et al., 1995; Zhang, Howell, & Howell,
2016), presumably because, as Kasser et al. (2004) suggested, some people who are
socioeconomically disadvantaged might compensate for their feelings of inadequacy or
insecurity by adoptingmaterialistic values and goals. However, peoplewho feel relatively
deprived, regardless of their absolute material standing, may also place importance on
acquiring money and possessions to compensate for the sense that they are getting less
than they deserve relative to others. That is, resentment stemming from unfavourable
social comparisonsmight lead some people to orient towardsmaterialism, even if they are
otherwise ‘objectively’ affluent. This analysis fits well with research showing that,
because believing oneself to be worse off than similar others is aversive (Callan, Kim, &
Matthews, 2015a), people often adopt various strategies to minimize feeling relatively
deprived (e.g., by gambling, or by improving one’s professional qualifications; see Smith
et al., 2012, for a review).We investigated the adoption ofmaterialistic values and goals as
one such strategy.
Overview of current research
In five studies, we examined whether people higher in PRD place greater importance
on materialistic values and goals. As Dittmar et al. (2014) highlighted in their recent
meta-analysis, two broad types of measures of materialism exist in the literature: (1)
those that ask respondents to rate their agreement with statements concerning
materialistic beliefs, behaviours, and values (e.g., the Material Values Scale [MVS];
Richins & Dawson, 1992); and (2) those where participants indicate the importance
they place on goals for financial and material success (e.g., the Aspiration Index; Kasser
& Ryan, 1993). We employed both of these types of measures. Study 1 examined
whether individual differences in PRD are associated with the endorsement of material
values over and above several individual difference factors that might confound this
relationship.
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Personal relative deprivation requires social comparison. In Studies 2 and 3, we
examined whether a tendency to engage in social comparison correlates with the
perceived importance of financial success (Study 2) and material values (Study 3)
through PRD. In Study 4, we sought causal evidence for the idea that PRD contributes to
materialismby experimentallymanipulating adverse social comparisons and assessing the
degree to which participants placed importance on acquiring more income relative to
giving more to charity. In Study 5, we examined whether participants higher in PRD
would report spending more money on things they wanted relative to other types of
expenditures (e.g., donating to charity, investments) during an imaginary windfall-
spending task.
Participant sampling
Across our studies, the minimum required sample sizes were based on the sample size
required to obtain 80% power (usually much higher) to detect ‘medium’ effect sizes (e.g.,
d = 0.45 for Study 4) at p < .05 (two-tailed). However, the final sample sizes were not
completely predetermined because of the unpredictable nature of participant recruit-
ment (e.g., excessive sign-ups, removal of participants who failed an attention check).
STUDY 1
Consistent with the preceding theoretical analysis, Zhang, Tian, Lei, Yu, and Liu (2015)
found that self-reported PRD correlated positively with endorsement of material values.
One issue that has yet to be resolved, however, is whether PRD uniquely contributes to
materialism over and above relevant individual difference factors that might confound
their relationship. That is, people higher in PRD might endorse material values simply
because they also feel less powerful and more uncertain, have lower self-esteem, or are
lower in SES (cf. Kasser et al., 2004). In Study 1, we aimed to establishwhether individual
differences in PRD correlate positively with materialism over and above these factors.
Method
Participants
Participants from the United States (N = 393; 230 males; Mage = 35.37, SDage = 11.25)
were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Eight additional participants were
excluded because of duplicate IP addresses.
Procedure and measures
Participants completed the measures listed below. The first four measures listed below
were presented in random order between participants. None of themeasures included an
attention check item.
Personal relative deprivation
We used Callan, Shead, and Olson’s (2011) five-item Personal Relative Deprivation Scale
(PRDS) to measure individual differences in PRD. The PRDS measures people’s general
beliefs and feelings associated with comparing their outcomes to the outcomes of similar
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others (e.g., ‘I feel deprived when I think about what I have compared to what other
people likeme have’; ‘I feel privileged compared to other people likeme’). The PRDS asks
participants to make their ratings of what they have relative to similar others because
such comparisons (vs. comparisons with dissimilar others) provide the most diagnostic
information for self-evaluation (Callan et al., 2015a; Festinger, 1954; Wood, 1989).
The PRDS has acceptable test–retest and internal reliability (Callan et al., 2015a) and
predicts theoretically relevant consequences of higher PRD, including lower self-esteem
(Callan, Ellard, Shead, & Hodgins, 2008), increased gambling urges among gamblers
(Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2015), delay discounting (Callan et al., 2011; Mishra &
Novakowski, 2016), and poorer self-rated health (Callan et al., 2015a; Mishra & Carleton,
2015). Participants responded to the items using a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree,
6 = strongly agree). Higher values indicate higher PRD.
Personal sense of power
Wemeasured personal sense of power using Anderson, John, and Keltner’s (2012) eight-
item Personal Sense of Power Scale (e.g., ‘In my relationship with others, I can get people
to listen to what I say’; ‘I think I have a great deal of power’). Participants rated the items
using a 7-point scale (1 = Disagree strongly, 7 = Agree strongly). Higher values indicate
higher personal sense of power.
Self-esteem
Weassessed self-esteemusing Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (e.g., ‘On thewhole, I
am satisfiedwithmyself’; ‘At times I think I amno good at all’). Participants rated the items
using a 4-point scale (1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree); higher values indicate
higher self-esteem.
Emotional uncertainty
We employed the 15-item emotional uncertainty subscale of the Uncertainty Response
Scale (Greco & Roger, 2001; e.g., ‘I feel anxious when things are changing’; ‘I get worried
when a situation is uncertain’). Participants indicated how often they experienced each
statement using a 4-point scale (1 = Never, 4 = Always). Higher values indicate greater
emotional uncertainty.
Materialism
To assess materialistic values, we used Richins and Dawson’s (1992) widely used 18-item
MVS (e.g., ‘I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes’; ‘The things I
own aren’t all that important to me’; ‘It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can’t
afford to buy all the things I’d like’). Participants rated the item using a 5-point
scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree), and higher values indicate greater
materialism.
Income and education
Participants reported their annual household income before taxes by selecting one of
eight categories (1 = less than $15,000, 2 = $15,001 to $25,000, 3 = $25,001 to
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$35,000, 4 = $35,001 to $50,000, 5 = $50,001 to $75,000, 6 = $75,001 to $100,000,
7 = $100,001 to £150,000, 8 = greater than $150,000). Across our studies, we coded
income responses using the category mid-points, with the value for the open-ended top
category being Parker and Fenwick’s (1983) median-based estimator. Participants also
indicated their highest level of educational attainment (1 = did not finish high school,
2 = high school graduation, 3 = college graduation, 4 = postgraduate degree), which
we treated as a continuous variable following previous research (e.g., Kraus, Adler, &
Chen, 2013).
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and correlations among the measures are shown
in Table 1. Personal relative deprivation, sense of power, self-esteem, and emotional
uncertainty all correlated significantly with materialism in the expected directions.
Neither income nor educational attainment correlated significantly with materialism.
Crucially, a multiple regression analysis showed that PRD accounted for significant
incremental variance in materialism over and above sense of power, self-esteem,
emotional uncertainty, annual income, and education attainment (see Table 2). There-
fore, the relation between PRD and materialism does not appear to be confounded by
these individual difference factors that have been shown previously to contribute to
material values.
STUDY 2
Personal relative deprivation, by definition, requires comparisonwith others (Smith et al.,
2012). Although the tendency to compare oneself with others is ubiquitous, individual
differences exist in people’s tendencies to engage in social comparisons (Buunk &
Gibbons, 2006), and these individual differences predict people’s experiences of PRD
(Callan, Kim, & Matthews, 2015b). Further, research has shown that a tendency to make
social comparisons is linked positively to materialism (e.g., Chan & Prendergast, 2007;
Mandel, Petrova, &Cialdini, 2006; Richins, 1995; Sirgy, 1998). In Studies 2 and 3, then,we
examined whether individual differences in the tendency to make social comparisons is
one precursor to PRD, which, in turn, relates to materialistic values and goals.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for measures used in Study 1
Measures M (SD) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. PRDS 3.20 (1.15) (.87)
2. Power 4.69 (1.24) .37* (.93)
3. Self-esteem 2.98 (.64) .47* .48* (.94)
4. Uncertainty 2.11 (.64) .47* .41* .49* (.94)
5. Materialism 2.76 (.72) .49* .12* .29* .33* (.91)
6. Income ($) 52.4k (38.2k) .32* .20* .18* .16* .03 –
7. Education 2.74 (.66) .19* .14* .15* .21* .07 .34* –
Note. PRDS = Personal Relative Deprivation Scale; Power = Personal Sense of Power Scale.
When applicable, alpha reliabilities are presented in parentheses along the diagonal.
*p < .05.
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It is likely, however, that not all social comparison tendencies are relevant to either the
experience of PRD or materialistic values and pursuits. Specifically, since Festinger’s
(1954) original formulation of social comparison theory, researchers have distinguished
between social comparisons of abilities and social comparisons of opinions (for reviews,
see Suls,Martin, &Wheeler, 2000;Wheeler,Martin, & Suls, 1997). The former are typically
instigated by self-evaluative questions of ‘how am I doing’ (Dakin & Arrowood, 1981),
whereas the latter concern questions of ‘what shall I believe, like, or feel’ (Suls et al.,
2000). Given this distinction, a tendency to make opinion comparisons (e.g., ‘My co-
worker feels more strongly about affirmative action than I do’) might be less relevant to
people’s experiences of PRD, and therefore materialism, than a tendency to make ability
comparisons (‘My co-worker has more than I do’).
Along with assessing PRD and the relative importance of financial success, in Study 2
we employed the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM; Gibbons
& Buunk, 1999) to assess individual differences in both the tendencies to make opinion
and ability comparisons. We expected ability comparisons, but not opinion comparisons,
to relate to the perceived relative importance of financial success through PRD. The
results of an exploratory study we conducted prior to Study 2 lend weight to this
hypothesis: Individual differences in ability comparisons, but not opinion comparisons,
related to PRDand the perceived importance of financial success.1 Full details of this study
are available in the Supporting Information.
Method
Participants
Participants from the United States were recruited through MTurk (N = 381, 51% male;
Mage = 35.95, SDage = 11.29). Twenty-nine additional participants were excluded
because of duplicate IP addresses (n = 11) or failing a basic attention check item (n = 18).
Table 2. Multiple regression analysis for Study 1
Predictors
Material values
b (SE) 95% CI for b b sr2
PRDS 0.31 (0.03) 0.24, 0.37 .49* .16
Power 0.06 (0.03) 0.01, 0.12 .11* .009
Self-esteem 0.08 (0.06) 0.20, 0.04 .07 .003
Uncertainty 0.16 (0.06) 0.04, 0.28 .14* .01
Income 4e-6 (9e-7) 2e-6, 6e-6 .21* .04
Education 0.02 (0.05) 0.12, 0.08 .02 <.001
Note. PRDS = Personal RelativeDeprivation Scale; Power = Personal Sense of Power Scale; sr2 = semi-
partial correlation-squared.
*p < .05.
1 Following Gibbons and Buunk’s (1999) suggested use of the INCOM, our original analysis strategy for this exploratory study was
to use the full measure (i.e., averaged across ability and opinion comparisons) to predict personal relative deprivation and the
importance of financial success. Recent research, however, suggests that the two-factor solution – with ability and opinion
comparisons as separate but correlated factors – better fits the data and is more valid (Callan et al., 2015b; Schneider& Schupp,
2014). Therefore, the current Study 2 is a confirmatory study of an exploratory study using the separate subscales as predictors.
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Procedure and materials
Participants completed the following measures in order:
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM)
We employed the INCOM to measure participants’ tendency to engage in social
comparisons (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). The INCOM is comprised of 11 items that
measure people’s tendencies to engage in social comparisons of abilities (e.g., ‘I often
compare myself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life’; ‘If I want to
findouthowwell I have done something, I comparewhat I havedonewithhowothers have
done’) and opinions (e.g., ‘If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what
others think about it’; ‘I often try tofindoutwhat others thinkwho face similar problemsas I
face’). Individuals scoring higher on the INCOM seek out more comparisons and spend
more time engaging in social comparisons (see Buunk & Gibbons, 2006). Higher scores
indicate stronger tendency to engage in social comparisons of ability and opinion.
PRDS
Participants completed the five-item PRDS used in Study 1.
Relative importance of financial success
We used the Aspiration Index (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996) to assess the perceived
importance of financial success relative to other life-goals. TheAspiration Index contained
seven different life-goal categories (self-acceptance, affiliation, community feeling,
physical fitness, financial success, attractive appearance, and social recognition). Each
life-goal was assessed with four or five items (32 items in total). Participants rated the
importance of each statement on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very
important).
Following previous research (Dittmar et al., 2014), we operationalized materialism in
Study 2 as the importanceparticipants placed onfinancial success as a life-goal (four items,
e.g., ‘You will have a lot of expensive possessions’; ‘You will be financially successful’)
relative to the other life-goals. This was achieved by subtracting each participant’s mean
across all domains from themeanof the four items assessing their perceived importance of
financial success (cf. Sheldon&McGregor, 2000; Sheldon, Sheldon, &Osbaldiston, 2000).
This yields a measure of the relative centrality of financial success to each participant’s
value system (see Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996). Higher scores indicate greater perceived
importance of financial success relative to other life-goals.
Income and education
Participants reported their annual income and level of educational attainment as per
Study 1.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and correlations among the measures are shown
in Table 3. Personal relative deprivation and the tendency to make ability comparisons
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correlated significantly with the relative importance of financial success in the
expected directions. The tendency to make opinion comparisons did not correlate
significantly with the relative importance of financial success. Although opinion
comparisons correlated significantly with PRD, a multiple regression analysis with
opinion and ability comparisons predicting PRD showed that opinion comparisons did
not uniquely predict PRD (b = .05, b = .03, SE = .09), t(378) = .56, p = .58,
sr2 = .0007, over and above the contribution of ability comparisons (b = .39, b = .33,
SE = .07), t(378) = 5.87, p < .001, sr2 = .08. Annual household income and educa-
tional attainment did not correlate significantly with the relative importance of financial
success.
Using Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) bootstrapping procedure, we tested the indirect
effect of the tendency to make ability comparisons on the relative importance of
financial success through PRD (see Figure 1). The results showed that PRD mediated
the relation between social comparison of abilities and the relative importance of
financial success (10,000 resamples; indirect effect = .065, 95% bias-corrected and
accelerated confidence interval [BCa CI] of .038 and .101), suggesting that one reason
why social comparison of abilities is related to the relative importance of financial
success is PRD. The same analyses controlling for annual income and educational
attainment revealed similar results (indirect effect = .080, 95% BCa CI of .049 and
.120).
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we aimed to replicate our Study 2 findings using a measure of material values
(as per Study 1) among a sample of British participants. Given our Study 2 findings (see
also the Supporting Information), we focused on PRD as a mediator of the relation
between social comparison of abilities and material values.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for measures used in Studies 2 and 3
Measures Mean (SD) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Study 2 (N = 381)
1. INCOM-ability 3.14 (.90) (.87)
2. INCOM-opinion 3.70 (.67) .47* (.75)
3. PRDS 3.25 (1.08) .31* .12* (.82)
4. Financial Success .33 (.65) .27* .004 .35* –
5. Income ($) 51.6k (35.5k) .13* .04 .25* .03 –
6. Education 2.80 (.68) .09 .02 .01 .04 .34* –
Study 3 (N = 299)
1. INCOM-ability 3.37 (.86) (.87)
2. PRDS 3.15 (1.01) .40* (.81)
3. MVS 3.98 (1.23) .60* .44* (.90)
4. Income (£) 32.4k (20.9k) .06 .34* .09 –
Note. INCOM = Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure; PRDS = Personal Relative
Deprivation Scale; Financial Success = relative importance of financial success from the Aspiration
Index; MVS = Material Values Scale.
When applicable, alpha reliabilities are presented in parentheses along the diagonal.
*p < .05.
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Method
Participants
Participants were from the United Kingdom (N = 299; 53% male; Mage = 34.64,
SDage = 11.61) and completed a brief online survey through either ProlificAca-
demic.co.uk or CrowdFlower.com (ns = 153 and 146, respectively) for a nominal
payment. Fourteen additional participants were excluded because of duplicate IP
addresses (n = 4) or not being UK residents (n = 10). The latter participants were
removed because we asked participants to provide their annual household income in
pound sterling.
Procedure and materials
Participants completed the six-item social comparison of abilities subscale of the INCOM,
the five-item PRDS, and the nine-item short form of the MVS (Richins, 2004) in order.
Along with reporting their age and gender, participants provided their annual household
income using an 18-point scale with values ranging from 1 (less than £5,000) to 18
(£85,001 and above), with each option spanning £4,999. None of themeasures included
an attention check item.
Figure 1. Mediational models for Studies 2, 3, and 4. INCOM = Iowa-Netherlands Comparison
Orientation Measure; PRD = personal relative deprivation. Values depict unstandardized regression
coefficients. *p < .05.
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Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and correlations among the measures are shown
in Table 3. Social comparison tendency, PRD, and material values all correlated
significantly with each other in the expected directions. Annual household income did
not correlate significantly with material values. As shown in Figure 1, bootstrapped
mediation analyses showed that PRD mediated the relation between social comparison
tendency and material values (10,000 resamples; indirect effect = .138, 95% BCa CI of
.073 and .217). The same analyses controlling for annual household income revealed
nearly identical results (indirect effect = .137, 95% BCa CI of .073 and .217).
STUDY 4
One limitation of Studies 1 to 3 is the use of cross-sectional designs. We therefore cannot
rule out the possibility that rather than our proposed model (i.e., social comparison ?
PRD?materialism), materialism might lead to PRD (e.g., through overspending), or that
feeling resentful might make people more attuned to what others have. In Study 4, we
experimentally manipulated adverse social comparisons by convincing participants that
they had either less or the same level of discretionary incomecompared to peoplewith the
same background characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education). This manipulation has
been shown to increase resentment and a sense of unfairness (Callan et al., 2008) and
lower subjective social status (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, Kay, & Payne, 2015), even
though actual financial position is held constant between experimental conditions. In
contrast to other manipulations (e.g., those involving unjust vs. no government decisions
within a hypothetical commons dilemma game; Zhang et al., 2015), this manipulation
specifically varies adverse social comparisons with similar others and therefore is directly
tied to the construct of PRD. Following Smith et al.’s (2012)model of relative deprivation,
we also measured resentment with one’s current level of discretionary income as a
potential mediator of the effect of the relative discretionary income manipulation on
materialism.
Method
Participants
Participants were 164 staff and students from the University of Essex whowere recruited
through a research participant database (76%women;Mage = 21.74, SDage = 3.50). They
participated in exchange for course credit or £3. Ten additional participants were not
included in analyses because,whenprobed during debriefing, theywere suspicious of the
veracity of the feedback they received (n = 3) or did not correctly understand the
meaning of the feedback (n = 7).
Procedure and materials
Manipulation of personal relative deprivation
We told participants that the study was part of an ongoing research project examining
trends in the discretionary income of students and staff at the University of Essex. We
informed them that a computerized surveywould provide themwith feedback about how
their discretionary income compares with the discretionary income of people who
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matched their ‘personal profile’ in our database, which would be determined by the
information they provided.
Ostensibly to create their ‘profile’, participants first completed a scale about their
financial beliefs and behaviours (Callan et al., 2011) and a personality inventory (Gosling,
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). Next, they provided background demographic information
(i.e., gender, age, employment status,marital status, universitymajor if applicable, years of
education, and whether they live at home) and reported their annual household income
and average monthly spending over the previous 6 months on housing, utilities, food,
clothing, transportation, and debt. Once participants had entered their information, they
were shown a screen that read:
On the basis of the information you provided, we will now calculate your Comparative
Discretionary Income Index (CDI Index) Score. The CDI index measures a person’s
standing in terms of his/her average monthly discretionary income relative to the
discretionary income of similar others. Based on the information you provided, the index
will produce a score using your profile and the information in our StatsPlusTM database
from people who match your profile. The score will tell you in pounds (£) how much
average monthly discretionary income you have relative to people who match your profile.
Depending on current database activities, the process may take up to a minute to
complete.
Participants then saw a series of progress screens that were designed to create the
impression that their ‘personal profile’ was being constructed and their ‘CDI Index Score’
calculated. Once ‘finished’, participants saw their CDI Index Score, which was presented
in large font size within a large black rectangle. Randomly determined, the CDI Index
Score that participants were shown was either ‘£ 313’ (n = 80) or ‘£ +54’ (n = 84; the
experimenter was blind to the condition). Participants read the following about the
meaning of their score:
How to interpret your StatsPlusTM CDI Index Score
Your CDI Index Score was derived from statistical analyses using both the information from
your profile and the information in our database frompeoplewhomatched your profile. Your
CDI Index Score represents on average how much monthly discretionary income you have
relative to peoplewho are highly similar to you in personal characteristics and background. A
negative (-) CDI Index Score means that you have on average less discretionary income than
similar others. A positive (+) CDI Index Score means you have on average more discretionary
income than similar others.
Participants were given a form to write down their score to ‘make it available to the
researcher for use in his/her study (if requested)’.
Resentment
After participants wrote down their respective CDI Index Score, they rated how
dissatisfied, satisfied (reverse-scored), and resentful they felt about their current level of
discretionary income (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very). These items were averaged to form a
composite measure of resentment (a = .76).
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Desire for more discretionary income and giving to charity
We designed a measure of the relative importance of financial success that was modelled
after the Aspiration Index but tailored towards participants’ current concerns about their
level of discretionary income compared to their current desire to give to charity. Across
five items, participants indicated how much they desired to increase their discretionary
income, how important more discretionary income seemed to them, how much they
wanted more discretionary income, how motivated they were to obtain more
discretionary income, and how much they felt like they needed more discretionary
income (e.g., ‘How important does having more discretionary income seem to you right
now?’; 1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely; a = .93). Next, they completed five identically
phrased items about their current desire to give to charity (e.g., ‘How important does
giving money to charity seem to you right now?’; a = .95). We chose these items to
represent a goal, akin to ‘community feeling’ from the Aspiration Index, that is opposite to
the goal of financial success in Grouzet et al.’s (2005) circumplexmodel of goal contents.
Following our approach in Study 2 using the Aspiration Index, and consistent with
Dittmar et al.’s (2014) definition of materialism noted above, we therefore operationally
defined materialism as the perceived importance of attaining more discretionary income
relative to giving more to charity, which was calculated by subtracting each participant’s
mean across the charity items from the mean of the ‘wanting more discretionary’ income
items.2 Finally, participants were debriefed and probed for their correct understanding of
the meaning of their ‘CDI Index Score’.
Results and discussion
Participantswho learned that they had lessmonthly discretionary income thanpeople like
them reported feeling significantly more resentful (M = 4.18, SD = 1.39) than did
participantswho learned that they had roughly the samemonthly discretionary income as
similar others (M = 2.80, SD = 1.28), t(162) = 6.63, p < .001, d = 1.04 (95% CI of the
mean difference: 0.97, 1.79). Moreover, participants who learned that they had less
monthly discretionary income than similar others reported a greater desire for more
discretionary income relative to giving more to charity (M = 1.68, SD = 1.94) than those
who learned their discretionary was roughly the same as others (M = .80, SD = 2.07),
t(162) = 2.78, p = .006, d = 0.43 (95% CI of the mean difference: 0.25, 1.49).
Resentment and the relative desire for more discretionary income were significantly
correlated, r = .54, p < .001. As shown in Figure 1, bootstrapped mediation analyses
showed that resentment mediated the effect of themanipulation on the relative desire for
more discretionary income (10,000 resamples; indirect effect = .51, 95% BCa CI of 0.304
and 0.757).
Study 4 revealed that a manipulation of relative deprivation increased the relative
importance participants placed on acquiring more discretionary income. One potential
limitation of these findings is that participants might have reported feelingmore resentful
and wanting more discretionary income relative to giving more to charity when they
learned they had less income than similar others because they believed these responses
were what the researchers expected. Although we cannot completely rule out such
demand characteristics, it is important to highlight that our manipulation procedure did
2 This exact measure and the relative importance of financial success measure from the Aspiration Index were significantly
correlated, r = .45, p < .001, in a separate validation study with participants recruited through MTurk (N = 89;
Mage = 37.29; SDage = 12.22; 56% male).
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not inform participants that they did not have less discretionary income in any absolute
sense – instead, participants learned that they had less (or roughly the same) level of
discretionary income compared to people like them. Our cover story was as much about
‘trends indiscretionary income’as itwasabout the feedbackwegaveparticipantsabout their
‘profile’, yet ancillary analyses showed that participants’ actual household income did not
correlate significantlywith how resentful they felt about their current level of discretionary
income,r = .04,p = .63.Givenourcoverstory,reportinglowincomecouldhaveplausibly
been as much of a demand characteristic for reporting higher resentment as the relative
income information we provided, but income did not meaningfully correlate with
resentment. Nonetheless, it will be important for future research to assess the effects of
such adverse social comparisons usingmore indirect measures.
Although participants lower in annual household income reported wanting more
discretionary income relative to giving to charity, r = .18, p = .02, controlling for
household income did not alter the effect of the relative deprivation manipulation on
participants’ desire for more discretionary income relative to giving more to charity,
F(1,161) = 10.79, p = .001. Thus, the effect we observed here has less to do with beliefs
about not having money than beliefs about not having money relative to similar others –
learning that they had less discretionary income relative to others increased the relative
importance participants placed on achieving financial success above and beyond their
absolute financial position.
STUDY 5
Our first four studies found that PRD positively correlated with participants’ self-rated
beliefs, values, or goals associatedwith acquiringmoney andpossessions. To extend these
findings in a new direction, in Study 5 we explored whether PRD might also predict
people’s spending preferences, particularly in terms of how much of a financial windfall
theywould spend on things theywanted for themselves relative to other types of possible
expenditures (e.g., savings, giving to charity). Participants were asked to complete a task
where they imagined they were given $20,000 and had to spend it across a number of
spending categories, including buying things they wanted or needed. Several studies
using this windfall expenditure task have shown that people higher in materialism, as
measured by the MVS or Aspiration Index, spend more on things they want than people
lower inmaterialism (Kasser, 2005; Kasser et al., 2014; Richins, 2004; Richins &Dawson,
1992); if people higher (vs. lower) in PRD place greater importance on acquiring
possessions (i.e., are more materialistic), then they should prioritize buying things they
wanted when spending a windfall.
As in our previous studies, we also asked participants to report their annual household
income to control for their absolute financial status. Following Mick’s (1996) recommen-
dation for research on materialism, we also included a measure of socially desirable
responding (SDR) to explore whether the relation between PRD and windfall spending
might be confounded by SDR.
Method
Participants
Participants were from the United States or Canada (N = 799; 52% male; Mage = 34.96,
SDage = 11.56) who completed an online survey through either MTurk (n = 528) or
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Crowdflower.com (n = 271). Eighty-five additional participants were excluded because
of duplicate IP addresses (n = 26) or failing a basic attention check item (n = 59). Due
to a programming error, 60 participants from the United Kingdom were also able to
complete the survey; they were not included in analyses because our measures of
windfall spending and annual household income asked participants to provide their
responses in dollars.
Procedure and measures
Participants completed these measures in order:
Socially desirable responding
We used St€ober’s (2001) Social Desirability Scale-17 (SDS-17) to measure people’s
tendency to present themselves favourably (e.g., ‘I sometimes litter’; ‘I always eat a
healthy diet’). Participants answered ‘True’ or ‘False’ to the statements; participants
higher in socially desirable responding (SDR) are expected to over-report ‘good’
behaviour and under-report undesirable behaviour (Mick, 1996). The SDS-17 has good
internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity (Blake, Valdiserri, Neuendorf,
& Nemeth, 2006; St€ober, 2001).
Personal relative deprivation
Participants completed the five-item PRDS used in Study 1.
Imaginary windfall expenditure
To examine participants’ spending preferences, we asked them to imagine they had
unexpectedly received $20,000 and could spend it in seven ways: ‘Buy things I want or
need’, ‘Give to charity or church organizations’, ‘Give or lend to friends or relatives’,
‘Travel’, ‘Pay off debts’, ‘Savings or investments’, and ‘Other’ (Richins & Dawson,
1992). Participants provided only dollar amounts for each category (i.e., no itemized
textual responses by category were solicited). Participants were free to divide the
money between the categories as they wished, but had to ensure the total spending
summed to $20,000. The online survey showed participants a running total of their
‘spending’, and they could not advance to the next page unless the total value equalled
$20,000.
Income
Participants reported their annual household income before taxes as per Study 1.
Participants also reported their gender and age.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics and correlations among themeasures are shown inTable 4. Personal
relative deprivation and SDR were significantly negatively correlated, such that
participants higher in SDR reported lower PRD, suggesting the possibility that
participants under-report their perceived relative deprivation. In terms of the imaginary
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windfall spending, PRD correlated significantly with the amount of money participants
spent on things they wanted or needed, such that participants higher in PRD tended
to spend more on things they wanted or needed relative to the other spending
categories.
As depicted in Table 4, a multiple regression analysis showed that PRD remained a
significant predictor of the amount participants reported theywould spend on things they
wanted or needed while controlling for SDR and annual household income. The windfall
expenditure data were highly positively skewed and contained a large number of zero
responses, indicative of censoring (participants cannot indicate a negative allocation of
funds to a given category). Such data cannot be symmetrized by log transformation, so we
complemented our ordinal least squares (OLS) regression with a robust Tobit model, a
standard approach to analysing censored econometric data (Wooldridge, 2010). This was
performed using the zelig package (Imai, King, & Lau, 2007, 2008) in R. As shown in
Table 4, the Tobit model confirmed that PRD significantly predicted the amount
participants spent on things they wanted or needed over and above the contributions of
SDR and annual household income. Tobit regressions controlling for SDR and annual
household incomewere also run for each of the other spending categories of the windfall
expenditure task. These analyses revealed that PRD uniquely predicted the amount of
money participantswerewilling to donate to charity (B = 256.4, p = .002) but no other
spending category of the windfall expenditure task (all ps > .125). Thus, over and above
SDR and annual household income, higher PRDwas associatedwith spendingmore on the
self and giving less to charity.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations amongmeasures (top section) and estimates fromTobit
and OLS regression models predicting the amount of money participants spent on ‘buy things I want or
need’ from PRDS, SDR, and annual household income (bottom section) in Study 5
Measures Mean (SD) PRD SDR Income
1. PRD 3.12 (1.02) (.83)
2. SDR 8.57 (3.64) .181* (.77)
3. Income $52,933 (38,430) .253* .054 –
4. Buy things I want or need $3,829 (3,898) .158* .081* .102*
5. Give to church or charity $639 (1,156) .118* .137* .002
6. Give or lend to friends or relatives $903 (1,609) .016 .013 .051
7. Travel $1,763 (2,271) .013 .010 .032
8. Pay off debts $5,261 (5,357) .034 .021 .018
9. Savings or investments $6,969 (5,412) .065 .008 .086*
10. Other $636 (2,039) .053 .024 .079*
Robust Tobit model OLS model
Estimate SE p-value b [95% CI] SE p-value sr2
PRD 485.45 159.77 .002 489.52 [214, 765] 140.41 <.001 .014
SDR 87.15 44.00 .048 66.24 [141, 9] 38.23 .084 .004
Income 0.01 0.01 .017 0.007 [.015, .002] 0.004 .044 .005
Note. PRD = personal relative deprivation; PRDS = Personal RelativeDeprivation Scale; SDR = socially
desirable responding; OLS = ordinary least squares. When applicable, alpha reliabilities are presented in
parentheses along the diagonal.
*p < .05.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
In five studies, we found that PRDwas associated with materialistic values and goals. The
relation between PRD andmaterialismwas not confounded by other individual difference
factors known to influence materialism (i.e., personal sense of power, self-esteem,
emotional uncertainty, and socioeconomic status, SDR; Studies 1 and 5), and the tendency
to make social comparisons of abilities (but not opinion comparisons) correlated
positively with PRD,which, in turn, related tomaterialistic values and goals (Studies 2 and
3). Although previous studies have linked a general tendency to make social comparisons
to higher materialism (e.g., Chan & Prendergast, 2007; Mandel et al., 2006; Richins,
1995), none have shown that this relationship specifically occurs only for a tendency to
make ability comparisons. In Study 4, we provided causal evidence that unfavourable
social comparisons increase the relative importance participants placed on achieving
financial success. In Study 5, we found that participants higher in PRD planned to spend
more on things they wanted relative to other spending categories than participants lower
in PRD. Thus, the role the PRD plays in materialism is evident not only in people’s self-
rated beliefs, values, and goals but also in their spending preferences.
Taken together, our findings suggest that PRD contributes to materialism. It is
important to highlight that these studies are the first to show that absolute deprivation,
which we measured via annual household income, did not account for the relation
between PRD and materialism across our studies, and Study 4 showed that randomly
assigning participants to learn that they had less (vs. similar) discretionary income than
people like them increased the relative importance they placed on acquiring money.
Thus, simply lacking financial resources was, by and large, not associated with the
adoption of materialistic values and goals across our studies – instead, materialism was
predicted by participants’ concerns about their relative deprivation.
One alternative possibility, however, is that the relation between PRD andmaterialism
might be moderated by absolute income, such that the associations and effects we have
observedmight occur only –ormore strongly – for people experiencing absolute financial
deprivation. Moderated regression analyses of our data suggest this is not the case: Annual
household income did not significantlymodulate the relation between PRD and (1) scores
on the MVS (Studies 1 and 3 collated, N = 692; p = .19), (2) the relative importance
participants placed on financial success (combination of Study 2 and Study S1 in the
Supporting Information, N = 740; p = .99), and (3) windfall spending on things
participants wanted or needed (Study 5, p = .89). Furthermore, the effect of the
manipulation of adverse social comparisons on the relative desire for more discretionary
income in Study 4was not significantly modulated by annual household income (p = .09;
if anything, the effect was slightly stronger for participants higher in income). Thus, as we
noted in the Introduction, even people who are objectively ‘wealthy’ can feel resentful
aboutwhat they have comparedwithwhat others like themhave, and our findings suggest
that these feelings correlate with the importance they place on acquiring money and
possessions.
Although we found that our results were not due to or moderated by absolute
household income, it will be important for future research to probe the roles that other
economic indicators of people’s spending powermight play in the relation between PRD
andmaterialism. For example, the relation between PRD and the adoption of materialistic
goals might depend on one’s existing possessions and assets, how much people believe
they are able to spend money on the things they want, or even one’s access to credit (see
Matthews, Gheorghiu, & Callan, 2016, for a discussion of this issue).
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The results of our studies contribute to a growing body of research highlighting that
PRD is a distinct and important predictor of a variety of internal states and individual
behaviours (e.g., Callan, Kim, Gheorghiu, & Matthews, 2016; Callan et al., 2015b; Mishra
& Novakowski, 2016; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015; Smith et al., 2012; Tabri, Dupuis, Kim, &
Wohl, 2015). Insofar as materialism has detrimental consequences for individuals and for
society, interventions aimed at reducing it might focus on ameliorating people’s
resentment and sense of unfairness stemming from their relative material standing.
Moreover, increases in materialism may have less to do with increasing income
inequalities at the societal level than potentially greater access to unfavourable social
comparisons at the interpersonal level (e.g., through social media; de Vries & K€uhne,
2015).
Working from Dittmar et al.’s (2014) definition of materialism, we focused on
individual differences in the values and importance people placed on attainingmoney and
possessions. One avenue for future research will be to probe whether social comparison
tendencies and PRD further relate to the known behavioural consequences of
materialism, such as increased debt and actual spending behaviours (Garðarsdottir &
Dittmar, 2012). An additional possibility open for future enquiry is the idea that the causal
relation between PRD and materialism is bidirectional, such that over time higher PRD
might affect increased spending which, in turn, leads to increased PRD, such as through
the accumulation of debt or shifts in social comparison targets – potentially creating a
pernicious ‘feedback loop’.
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